08BANGKOK3317 PALACE INSIDER TELLS AMBASSADOR
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OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #3317/01 3110730
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 060730Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4937
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1154
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6471
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5023
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9171
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 5795
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003317 NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR WILDER AND PHU EO 12958 DECL: 11/06/2018 TAGS PGOV, KDEM, MOPS, ASEC, TH SUBJECT: PALACE INSIDER TELLS AMBASSADOR OF THE KING’S OPPOSITION TO A COUP AND TO PAD PROTESTS REF: A. BANGKOK 3289 (POLARIZATION TO PERSIST) B. BANGKOK 3280(THAKSIN ADDRESSES UDD) C. BANGKOK 3226 (HOPES FOR MEDIATION)D. BANGKOK 3080 (QUEEN SHOWS SUPPORT) BANGKOK 00003317 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT ------------------- ¶1. (C) King Bhumibol explicitly told Army Commander AnupongPaojinda not to launch a coup, XXXXXXXXXXXX, an advisor toQueen Sirikit, told Ambassador November 4. XXXXXXXXXXXX alsoclaimed that the Queen had not meant to signal support forthe People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) anti-governmentagenda when she presided over funeral ceremonies on October 13.XXXXXXXXXXXX said PAD’s activities had irritated the King,who reportedly wants PAD protestors to leave Government House.XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke well of Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat,saying Somchai was open to compromising with the PAD, althoughXXXXXXXXXXXX guessed Somchai would be forced from office bythe end of the year. Separately, a politically active businessmanwith strong connections to the palace told us that the Queen’sfuneral appearance had hurt the monarchy’s image, therebyserving the agenda of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.This contact also discussed a possible assassination plot againstThaksin and PAD plans for violence. Both contacts claimed the Kingsuffered from back pain and his condition was frail.¶2. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX’s claim that the King instructedAnupong not to conduct a coup is the strongest account we haveheard to date about the King’s opposition to a coup and hiscommunicating this to Anupong; it would explain why PrivyCounselors Prem and Siddhi, both seen as opponents of thecurrent government, gave recent assurances to the Ambassadorthat there would not be a coup. While XXXXXXXXXXXX did notspecify how he heard of this exchange, the purportedinstruction does appear consistent with Anupong’s actions,other high-level military assurances to the Ambassador,and reporting in other channels. We agree that the Queen’sfuneral appearance was a significant blunder, jeopardizingthe public’s perception of the palace’s neutrality. PADappears increasingly divided; this divide, as well as theintense and dynamic condition of Thai politics, may make itappear realistic to hope for a PAD-government compromise.Possible further violence, however, remains a concern.End Summary and Comment.PALACE-PAD RELATIONS -------------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador met privately at the Residence on November 4with XXXXXXXXXXXX, a close advisor to Queen Sirikit who in thepast has also served as a confidant of the King.XXXXXXXXXXXXremarked that he regretted the Queen’s October 13 appearanceat the funeral of a PAD supporter (ref D). He claimed the Queenhad been emotionally affected when she learned that one victimof the October 7 violence was a young lady about to be married,and that she had told her father she was going to the protestto defend the monarchy. Initially, the Queen had wanted to sendPrincess Chulabhorn to the funeral. It was only at the requestof Chulabhorn and Chulabhorn’s companion, Chaichon Locharernkul,that the Queen decided to go herself. XXXXXXXXXXXX said therewas no intention for the Queen to involve either herself orthe monarchy in political matters, but, unfortunately, somemembers of the public could interpret the funeral appearancedifferently. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Queen later reached out toseriously injured police officers in an attempt to show herneutrality, but this signal went largely unnoticed.¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that King Bhumibol was highlyirritated by PAD’s occupation of Government House and otherdisruptions caused by the anti-government group, but theKing was unsure how best to ensure PAD would vacate the compound.XXXXXXXXXXXX said the King had instructed two of his loyaliststo convey his desire that PAD leave Government House.(One of these messengers was well-known associate of the KingDisathorn Watcharothai, who said publicly on October 29 thatThais who love the King should “go home”; see ref A.)XXXXXXXXXXXX considered XXXXXXXXXXXX to be obstinate, however,saying Sondhi had become obsessed with his own sense of mission.By contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that XXXXXXXXXXXX wasreasonable and willing to compromise.POSITIVE VIEW OF SOMCHAI ------------------------ ¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed to have spoken to Prime MinisterSomchai Wongsawat about the current standoff. XXXXXXXXXXXXtold the Ambassador that Somchai had agreed that the governmentcould meet with the PAD and reach a compromise, but the timewas not yet ripe. In his conversation with the Ambassador,XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke highly of Somchai, saying he was “very good”and had many qualities that made him suitable to be Prime Minister,including a sense of fairness and a moderate temperament.Nevertheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that Somchai could notremain long in office because he would likely be forced outby an adverse Constitutional Court ruling in the People’s PowerParty (PPP) dissolution case (ref A), which XXXXXXXXXXXX believedthe Court might issue before the King’s birthday (December 5).XXXXXXXXXXXX guessed Somchai would dissolve the parliamentbefore being forced from office.KING TO ANUPONG: NO COUP ------------------------ ¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that the current turmoil would notresult in a military coup. He said that the King, speaking withArmy Commander Anupong Paojinda, had referred to the 2006 coupand made a statement to the effect that there should be no furthercoups.POLITICIZATION OF THE MONARCHY ------------------------------ ¶7. (C) We also met on November 5 with XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect),the well-connected scion of a wealthy family with close palace ties.XXXXXXXXXXXX had a leading role in the XXXXXXXXXXXX; his wife,XXXXXXXXXXXX, has the royal title of “XXXXXXXXXXXX” and worksclosely with the Queen. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that the Queen’sappearance at the October 13 funeral had highly negative ramifications,saying that even politically neutral Thais felt she had inappropriatelybrought the monarchy into politics. He also acknowledged increasingsemi-public criticism of the monarchy, focused on the Queen (septel).XXXXXXXXXXXX stated with confidence that the King had sought to deterthe Queen from attending the funeral by questioning the wisdom of thatplan, but had stopped short of forbidding her to do so.¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed former Prime Minister Thaksin’sstatement in his November 1 address to supporters (ref B) thateither “royal mercy or the people’s power” could allow his returnto Thailand. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this juxtaposition, which he viewedas highly strategic, had the predictable effect of energizingThaksin’s opponents in the royalist camp. This reaction allowedThaksin to demonstrate publicly that many palace figures were alignedagainst him, thereby eroding the prestige that the palace derivedfrom its status as an institution above politics. (Separately,after Thaksin’s remarks, a member of Thaksin’s legal team told usthat the sentence in question was part of a “very refined product”and that she had heard this sentence “four or five times” inThaksin’s rehearsal of the speech.)THAKSIN’S ENEMIES’ PLANS FOR VIOLENCE ------------------------------------- ¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX believed PAD continued to aim for a violentclash that would spark a coup. He asserted that he had dined onOctober 6 with a leading PAD figure (NFI), who explained thatPAD would provoke violence during its October 7 protest at theparliament. The unnamed PAD figure predicted (wrongly) that theArmy would intervene against the government by the evening ofOctober 7. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted to us that PAD remained intenton a conflict that would generate at least two dozen deaths andmake military intervention appear necessary and justified.¶10. (C) We mentioned to XXXXXXXXXXXX the claim by Thaksin associateXXXXXXXXXXXX that Thaksin had been the target of an assassinationplot (ref C). (Note: Subsequent to the Ambassador’s meeting withXXXXXXXXXXXX, another Thaksin ally related the same claim, andsaid Thaksin himself had spoken of this plot. End Note.) XXXXXXXXXXXXsuggested XXXXXXXXXXXX’s list of conspirators -- including twoprominent judges -- was not credible, but XXXXXXXXXXXX said hecould confirm (presumably because of first-hand discussion withan organizing figure) that certain enemies of Thaksin (NFI)had sought to kill him. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had been surprisedto learn that the contract on Thaksin’s life entailed a relativelylow payment of only several hundred thousand Baht (in the range of10,000 USD), although it also entailed resettlement abroad for theperson(s) directly involved.REMARKS ON THE KING’S HEALTH ---------------------------- ¶11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX (late August/early September). At that time,he said, the King’s complexion appeared healthy, but overall theKing appeared frail. He added that the King was upset with the Thaidoctor who had organized the team that performed back surgery onthe King two years ago, as the operation had not worked as well asthe King had been led to expect. XXXXXXXXXXXX, in his meeting withthe Ambassador, also said the King was suffering from back pain,and his activities were more limited than in recent years. JOHN
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